Abstract-Smartphones and tablets have become prime targets for malware, due to the valuable private and corporate information they hold. While Anti-Virus (AV) program may successfully detect malicious applications (apps), they remain ineffective against low-level rootkits that evade detection mechanisms by masking their own presence. Furthermore, any detection mechanism run on the same physical device as the monitored OS can be compromised via application, kernel or boot-loader vulnerabilities. Consequentially, trusted detection of kernel rootkits in mobile devices is a challenging task in practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, mobile devices have emerged as a preferred target for cyber criminals. This trend is fueled by the lucrative private and organizational information stored on those devices. Android is by far the most popular mobile Operating System (OS); its numerous vulnerabilities, coupled with the ease of distributing malicious code through its flexible app market, have turned this OS into the attackers' favorite target [1] . For example, the Droid Dream attack [2] distributed through legitimate applications on the Android market infected about 50,000 mobile devices in a course of few days. More recently, an Android 'bootkit', i.e. a rootkit that modifies the device's boot partition and booting script (codenamed 'Oldboot') has infected more than 500,000 mobile devices in China alone, within a period of six months [3] .
A. Kernel Rootkits
Mobile and desktop malware can operate in user space or kernel space. The user space malware can modify and inject code only into the memory areas allocated to apps and user processes. The kernel space malware can manipulate objects that reside in the entire memory area of the OS. Although sophisticated Mandatory Access Control (MAC) mechanisms such as SElinux [4] are integrated into current versions of Android, malware developers still manage to run their code in the kernel [5] [6] [3] . Rootkits are kernel space malware that use illicitly granted exclusive permissions to hide the malware's existence from detection systems, by manipulating the kernel's internal data structures [7] . A malicious code that has penetrated into the memory of the kernel can neutralize any security tool running in the OS. For instance, if an process sends a request to the kernel asking for the list of files in a specific directory there is no guarantee for the integrity of the returned list. Consequently, in order to detect presence rootkits, a trusted snapshot of the kernel memory has to be obtained [8] .
B. The Proposed System
In this paper we present JoKER (JTAG observe Kernel), a system that utilizes the JTAG hardware interface of the mobile device in order to obtain trusted snapshot of the device memory for detection of kernel rootkits. The JTAG standard [9] was developed to assist with system testing and debugging the circuit board after manufacturing. JTAG's connectors are installed on the Printed Circuit Board (PCB) of modern mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets. Our detection system uses two important debugging features of JTAG:
1. The ability to halt the system instantly by sending special instruction to the main processor.
2. The ability to access the content of the device's volatile memory (RAM) while it is being halted. The overall system does not run on the mobile device and therefore can securely read the kernel's memory areas in a trusted manner.
Once the kernel memory is extracted, it is p array of programmed scripts. Each script reco data-structures in the kernel and analyzes th suspicious modifications. We present the sys and discuss the implementation in details. shows that JoKER can successfully det modified objects at the Android kernel in a tru
C. Method Limitation
Using the JTAG interface requires physic the JTAG port which is placed on the sm board. Compared to software-based method may appear rather awkward. However, memory acquisition capabilities (from outsid offers the advantage of trusted mem Accordingly, our proposed system aims at find sophisticated rootkits where other detection m within the device, cannot be trusted.
D. Our Contribution
JTAG, as a general forensic tool for embed Android systems was mentioned in prior wor paper introduces several contributions and prior related work in the field.
• First, we are the first to propose an au focused on detecting kernel rootkits for and ARM architecture, by utilizing JTAG forensics. Our method is trusted since hardware-based, and transparent to the hence cannot be subverted. We pre architecture and detailed working implem detection system, at both hardware and so • Second, we discuss five rootkit mech Android kernel and show how they can our system. • Third, we introduce a new method for processes by analyzing the Android mechanism.
• Forth, we show how to overcome se involved with our low-level examination Those challenges include translating b and virtual memory addresses, along notorious kernel synchronization issues.
II. RELATED WORK
While existing mobile antivirus apps may d malware, they are in general not effective for kernel level rootkits [5] [12] . Tools such as th Extractor (LiME) [13] , and DMD [14] acquisition and analysis of volatile memo However, since these tools operate from wit can be subverted by a rootkit, hence cannot be trusted. Android kernel securing and hard [17] [8] . The Dump is running in the e an isolation between the ol. However, as long as the ame physical device as the mised via runtime or boot-AG was discussed as a tool system [11] and in context ral manner. The memory extraction of the device's RAM by Finally, the set of scripts l memory.
system's components
The detection process consists of three m halting the processor of the target device kernel's data structures from the RAM, and forensic analysis algorithm to find rootkit extracted binaries. These steps are described subsections.
A. System Halting
JTAG can halt the core of the mobile devic command to the OCD [24] . We use this fu initial stage to ensure that no code is execute This fact plays a major role in the detecti design since the suspicion that the system is can prompt a running malware to mask its p the processor in a single command ensures cannot prepare its masking before the halt.
B. Extracting Kernel Memory
The second phase involves extraction o memory areas for further analysis in a sep Modern JTAG interfaces offer rich debuggi such as direct Read and Write access to the memory [24] . We have used JTAG's comman memory from the RAM of the device while decision about the memory regions to extrac specific analysis techniques. For demonstratio we used techniques adapted from studies r based rootkits [25] . Rootkits attack various d Linux systems, primarily the system call vector table and the kernel's processes list. W on extracting the related memory regions for f
C. Reconstruction and Analysis
During the third and final phase, the d applies analysis algorithms to the extracted ra process involves scanning for suspicious m memory regions. The scripts check the integr call table, the exception vector table, an interrupt handler. Since these objects shouldn' a regular Android system, we validate their in to a clean Android system.
Another script detects stealthy processes w from the kernel's processes list. Unlike the s the exception vector table, and the software i the processes list is a dynamic kernel object w frequently. Detecting hidden rootkit processe since rootkits typically remove their entry order to evade detection. To that end, our sys kernel's cache which is responsible for main the OS internal objects. We have app methodology by comparing the objects processes list to a baseline that consists of reconstructed from the protected cache poo between the two views indicates the pres processes. This method may reveal the prese main phases: (1) and can also pinpoint the processes hide.
IV. IMPLEMENT
We have implemented the JoKE the design outlined in section II. We controller [26] to communicate with device. The tests described in this Samsung Galaxy (S2 & S4) mo interface. On the software side, the B) extracts relevant memory regions A) via a set of PRACTICE scrip scripting language which opera TRACE32 microprocessor develop product line. Those tools are a programming access to on-chip d supports communication with the JT interfaces. The memory analyzer receives the raw memory data and scripts (Figure 1, D) . Each script rec as an array of bytes, performs its returns the results. All logs are save program and the final results are pre Figure 2 presents the system installed in our lab. setup as constructed and constructed and installed ussed earlier and consists of igure 2, C) which supports obile and embedded devices r is connected to the JTAG A), through a flat cable with e device (Figure 2, B) . The nected through a USB cable ller program (Figure 2, D) . PRACTICE scripts that are responsible for the memory extraction and th that are responsible for the memory analysis (F
A. System setup

B. Memory Analysis
JoKER is a generic framework which can b wide range of detection and analysis scripts testing we implemented five scripts, each targ type of rootkit technique. The scripts include table integrity checks, (2) exception vect integrity checks, (3) two types of software (SWI handler) integrity checks and (4) r process by analyzing the kernel's cache. To knowledge, the former method is new and in first time in this paper. The analyzed kern presented in Table 2 . For clarity, a flow of a s Android kernel along with the relevant tabl Appendix A. Prior to the system operation, the anal initialized with the physical address of the o kernel memory in the specific version of exa These parameters can be extracted from the list located at /proc/kallsyms. Note that these be retrieved from any clean device having the the kernel. We have developed a Loadable (LKM) which is executed on a clean (down official website) Android device with an ide the Kernel and report the parameters' valu system.
1) Physical to virtual memory translation
Since JTAG refers to memory in physical a to translate between the virtual addresses (O physical addresses (JTAG view). As the inp part of the kernel space, they can be calc virtual address by subtracting a fixed offset. case is the address of the EVT, since o architectures the virtual address of the EVT 0x00000000 or 0xffff0000. To calculate the of the EVT we used ARM's assembly ins he Python scripts Figure 2 
D. Dectection Flow
The flow chart in Figure 3 outli detection from the time that the in been set, the JTAG controller has b device, and the communication wit been initialized. We assume that kernel's memory has been taken with a clean kernel version (E.g., website). The main steps of the detection algo ess by traversing the page Android distributions that mit the kernel's symbol list, alizing parameters by using strategy for accessing the emonstrated in [7] .
ve checking the integrity of is scenario is relevant when forensic examination, for lication that may bring a
In such cases the forensic ystem at two points: before ean' snapshot) and after ines the process of rootkit nitializing parameters have been connected to the target th the control software has a clean snapshot of the previously from a device downloaded from official detection flow in our orithm are as follows:
Steps (1-4): Halting the CPU of target devic the integrity of the current system call Step (12): Reconstructing the l that appear in the cache mechanism of the ke comparison between the list of task_str extracted from the kernel's list, and those ex cache.
Step (14): If the kernel's process li differ by the task_structs, a hidden proces rootkit alert is triggered.
V. EVALUATION
We evaluate the detection system by testin types of suspicious kernel modification code implemented five kernel modules whic malicious operations. The reason for using rootkits rather than original ones is due to samples of rootkits for current mobile ph released to the research community (sou Interestingly, although kernel rootkits hav researched in the context of desktop operatin are no documented samples of rootkits for re Android. In addition, rootkits which target the of Linux kernel cannot be installed on the This is due to differences in the kernel arch the OSs, and the modified versions of LIBC OS. We evaluate the system with Android k 3.4.0 installed on Samsung Galaxy S2 a respectively.
A. Kernel Rookits
The rootkit mechanisms have been impleme of LKMs. Each of the five rootkits (Sample different malicious functionality. Sample address of four system calls in the system cal modifies an indirect pointer of the SWI h stored in the instruction at offset 0x8 in the modifies the address of the SWI handler whic EVT. Sample 4 modifies the offset of the s which is stored in the SWI handler routine. S process by removing it from the kernel's proce self-implemented rootkits is mainly due to th few modern samples of mobile rootkits have Note that self-implemented rootkits as an eval has been used in previous studies in the field [ 
B. Syscall Table Hooking
The first rootkit was implemen (syscallTableHook.ko 1 ) which mod system calls addresses in the system open(), and close(). We choose fo that can be used maliciously in ord sensors and network access operati by executing a PRACTICE script t the kernel's system call table before the rootkit.
In Figure 4 we see the two sna table in a binary form of hex edito four modified addresses in the tabl original addresses of the system cal the modified addresses are marked script checks which system calls h achieved by parsing the header file tree of the Android kernel. This file names of system call functions in t script receives the two snapshots of the list of functions from the kerne functions that were modified. The shown in Figure 5 . nted as a kernel module difies the address of four m-call table; read(), write(), our basic system functions der to intercept file system, ions. The experiment starts to get a binary snapshot of e and after the execution of apshots of the system call or viewer. As can be seen, le have been detected. The ls are marked in blue while in red. In the next step, the have been changed. This is (unistd.h) from the source e contains the order and the the table. Next, the Python f the system-calls table and el and returns the names of e output of the system is ysis script in which the nd identified, along with will be published online e (upper) and after
C. Exception Vector Table (EVT) hooking
In the ARM architecture, each exception branched to the Exception Vector Table ( EVT central component of the OS and is natur different hooking techniques. When a so happens in the system, the processor loads t offset 0x8 in the EVT to the instruction regis ( Figure 6 ). The instruction that will execute i pc, [pc, #1040] . This instruction loads the with the address of the software interrupt han resides in the offset 1040 (0x420) relative program counter
Figure 6: A snapshot of the EVT in the kern
The second rootkit was implemented as (HookBranchInstruction.ko) which modifie vector table. Our implementation technique applying two types of modifications to the table. First, it copies the address of a new SW memory at offset 0x424 in the exception vect the rootkit changes the instruction at offset address at offset 0x424 (the new handler) to of the original address. This technique allow hook the SWI handler and intercept interrupt in the system. Our system extracts the k before and after the rootkits installation, by u script. A Python script reconstructs and co views.
As can be seen in Figure 7 , the instruction at exception vector table has been changed from 0xe59ff414. This modification causes the proc address that resides at offset 0x424 of the tab address at offset 0x420. The difference betwe is identified and reported to the system as a ro
D. Hooking the Address of SWI Handler Rout
Another hooking approach is modifying t routine. Basically a rootkit injects the add handler function. By intercepting all interrup calls, the rootkit can perform malicious opera manner.
In our example As can be seen in Figure 8 , the addr been changed at offset 0x220 in exception vector table which is off the table. This difference ind modification has occurred. The eve as a rootkit alert.
E. Hooking the Code of SWI Handl
The last hooking technique inv code of the software interrupts routi Figure 9 : Part of the SWI han kernel memory Figure 9 shows the part of the SW address of the system call table wi current Program Counter. The sy located after the code of the han marked instruction, a rootkit can di to its own system call functions. (hookSysCallTableAddressInSwiHa entries of the instruction which lo pointer. Next, the instruction i instruction -ldr r8, [pc, #offset] , w offset of our system-call table.
Figure 10 depicts modifications o identified by our detection syst (0xe320f000) has been changed malicious system call table (0xc028 loads the address of the system cal been changed from add r8, pc, 0x9 PRACTICE script generates snapsh er (lower) the copies the binary content of ther address in the kernel f the handler and then puts ffset 0x420 of the exception he kernel's memory before , by using a PRACTICE nstructs and compares the ndler, before (upper) and cation ress of the SWI handler has n the second part of the fset 0x420 from the base of dicates that a malicious nt is reported to the system 
F. DKOM (Direct Kernel Object Manipulation)
Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (KDOM) is a technique used by a rootkit in order to hide itself from the OS layer. By directly accessing the data structures in the kernel, a rootkit can hide resources such as processes and threads descriptors, network connections and other objects in the memory. To examine the effectiveness of our system against DKOM, we implemented a rootkit (dkomRootkit.ko) which manipulates the linked list of the kernel's structures representing the list of processes and threads (task_structs). We executed a process on the device which simulates the malicious program (MalApp) that the rootkit intends to hide. The program itself is executed as a user-level process. Our rootkit scans the linked list of the kernel's task_structs, searching for a task with the name "MalApp", and removes it. Note that although the process is removed from the link list, it still exists in the scheduler's internal list; hence its execution is not terminated. To detect the hidden process, we developed a new cross-view strategy which uses the kernel's cache pool. The kernel cache contains the cached version of the task_struct while it is in use, or shortly after termination for reuse. Rookits typically do not interfere with the cache pool as it is an internally managed memory region. We used this fact to make analysis of the cache pool and identify traces of hidden processes. Our script reconstructs the processes list from the kernel's processes list and from the cache. The results of the comparison (Figure 11) show that all the tasks appearing in the linked list also appeared in the cache, but there is a task_struct that appears in the cache but is not part of the linked list of processes descriptors.
For the interested reader we point that in most Android distributions the cache mechanism does not have pointers to all slabs [28] that contain task_structs. Therefore, we obtained the slab addresses in the following manner: We traversed each Page Frame Number (PFN), translated it into a physical struct page address, and then checked whether the struct page represent a slab with task_struct objects. From each matching slab, we extracted all task_structs. 
1) Kernel Consistency
When evaluating the cross-view detection approach, we noticed that when the list of task_structs is extracted from the cache on the clean system, some of the structures might not appear in the kernel's process list. Although rare, this behavior should be understood and eliminated when dealing with clean systems. We found that the reason for this exceptional behavior is the way that the JTAG box communicates with the device. When our system starts executing any of the PRACTICE scripts, the processor of the target device is instructed to halt immediately. The problem is that when halting occurs, the kernel of the device is, very briefly in an unstable state. The cache mechanism reuses the objects of task_struct. Thus when a process ends its execution, the kernel should unlink it from its list of processes and only then mark it as an unused object in the cache. This process of object reuse is not an atomic operation, and the halting of the core of the system take place in the middle of the unlinking operation. This momentary unstable state causes some active processes to appear as if absent from the kernel's processes list. To distinguish between malicious processes (intentionally absent from the list) and "dummy" processes (absent because of the inconsistency), we have analyzed the task_structs of these "dummy" processes. In so doing, we have determined that the fields of pid, comm, state and flags in the task_structs can serve to indicate whether it is being halted. In some of these objects the value of the pid was 0 but the name of the process (comm) was not "swapper". Obviously, such an object cannot represent a runnable process as the only process in the system with pid 0 can be the swapper. Other active objects had a negative value in their state field. This field contains information about the runnable state of the process, and a negative value represents a non-runnable state. The last indicator is the flags field which contains information about the state of the process. The value of this field is a bitwise-OR of all the characteristics that represent the state of the process at the moment. If the least significant bits equal 2, then the process is in a shutting down mode. Since the kernel's nonconsistent task_structs can be filtered by the indicators listed above, we redesigned the detection system to filter these objects before comparing task_structs in the cache and in the linked list. We executed our redesigned detection mechanism on a typical clean system and validate that it does not issue false alarms as a side effect of the kernel cache behavior.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present JoKER, a framework which utilizes the hardware's JTAG interface for trusted memory forensics. Our system demonstrates how kernel level rootkits in the Android OS can be detected in an automated manner by employing various memory forensic techniques. Unlike conventional methods, our method is trusted since it is external, hardware-based, and undetectable by the malicious code within the device.
JoKER framework extracts areas of the kernel's memory, reconstructs them for further analysis, and raises a rootkit alert when positive evidence is encountered. We present the overall layout of the framework, along with its detailed implementation. Our system is evaluated under several attack patterns, demonstrating that it can successfully detect crafty kernel mode rootkits, whether persistent or non-persistent. We present the implementation of five types of rootkits, used for evaluating our system, and show how our system detects them. In particular, a new method is introduced for detecting hidden processes by analyzing the Android kernel cache data structure. We also discuss some technological challenges involved with our method, such as translation between physical and virtual memory addresses and resolving kernel synchronization issues. The detection system demonstrates the cross-view paradigm in which the inspected system is examined at multiple levels in order to expose contradicting traces suggesting the presence of a rootkit, and eliminate false alarms. Note that, although the original purpose of JTAG is system testing and verification, in this paper we show that it can also be used for low level malware detection. We believe that our current experimental system can serve as a platform or prototype for future research concerning trusted detection of mobile devices rootkits and similar kernel-level malware.
